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INTUITION VERSUS ALGORITHM:
THE CASE OF FORENSIC AUTHORSHIP
ATTRIBUTION
Lawrence M. Solan*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 2012, Barack Obama was reelected
President of the United States, having defeated his Republican
opponent, Mitt Romney. The vote in the Electoral College—the
official body that votes on a state-by-state basis—was decisive:
332–206.1 Obama also won the national popular vote by a
margin of about 4,850,000 votes (50.9% to 47.1%).2 But
Obama’s winning by a comfortable margin is not what many of
the pundits on television were predicting. Some announced that
Romney would win the election, including predictions that he

* Don Forchelli Professor of Law, and Director, Center for the Study of
Law, Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Silvia
Dahmen, Lorna Fadden, Roger Shuy and Ben Zimmer for valuable comments
on earlier drafts, and to the participants in the Authorship Attribution
Workshop held at Brooklyn Law School in October 2012, sponsored by the
National Science Foundation. This article is a substantially expanded and
revised version of my commentary, Ethics and Method in Forensic
Linguistics, PROC. INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC LINGUISTS’ TENTH BIENNIAL
CONF., 2012, at 362, available at http://www.forensiclinguistics.net/iafl-10proceedings.pdf. Research on this article was sponsored by a Dean’s Summer
Research Stipend from Brooklyn Law School.
1
2012 Electoral College Results, NARA, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/electoral-college/2012/election-results.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2013).
2
2012 Presidential Election, NARA, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/2012/popular-vote.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
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would win by a landslide.3 Most guessed that the election would
be much closer than it turned out to be.
If the television pundits were all over the lot and mostly
wrong, those who used sophisticated computational techniques to
draw inferences from polls fared much better. An article in the
New York Times shortly after the election put it this way:
It was not on any ballot, but one of the biggest
election contests this week pitted pundits against
pollsters. It was a pitched battle between two self-assured
rivals: those who relied on an unscientific mixture of
experience, anecdotal details and “Spidey sense,” and
those who stuck to cold, hard numbers.
When the results were tabulated, it became clear that
data had bested divination.4
Perhaps most prominent among the pollsters was New York
Times blogger Nate Silver. As of the morning of the election,
his “FiveThirtyEight” blog predicted that Obama would receive
313 electoral votes to Romney’s 225, and that Obama had a
90.9% chance of winning the election.5 Silver also predicted that
Obama would win the popular vote by 2.5 percentage points.6
He underestimated the margin of victory slightly in each
measure, but not by much, and did dramatically better than did
the pundits. Silver’s success made him a celebrity of sorts,
7
including an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.
3

See Benny Johnson, Romney Landslide: Here Are the Biggest Names
Predicting
It,
THEBLAZE.COM
(Nov.
4,
2012,
3:37
PM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/romney-landslide-here-are-the-biggestnames-predicting-it-how-it-will-happen/. Among such predictors were Dick
Morris, Karl Rove, Larry Kudlow, Joe Scarborough, and George Will. For
quotes from these pundits, see id.
4
Michael Cooper, Election Result Proves a Victory for Pollsters and
Other Data Devotees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P8.
5
Nate Silver, FiveThirtyEight: When Internal Polls Mislead, a Whole
Campaign May Be to Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/when-internal-pollsmislead-a-whole-campaign-may-be-to-blame/.
6
Id.
7
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast
Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-
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His book The Signal and the Noise is a tribute to the triumph of
algorithm over intuition.8
It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss intuitive expert
judgment generally, just because it fails at predicting the results
of presidential elections. Not all expert opinion based upon
experience can be reduced to “divination.” Through repeated
experience, people develop expertise of all kinds, ranging from
chess playing9 to medical diagnosis.10 No one accuses the best of
such people of using a divining rod simply because they do not
rely on computer algorithms. Moreover, we make judgments all
the time about what is likely to happen next, including, for
example, the judgment that it is safe to cross the street when the
traffic signal favors us and the cars are all stopped. Most of the
time, there is no computer algorithm with which we can
compare our rate of success, but we have a good sense—
confirmed by repeated experience—that we are making the right
decision.
On the other hand, the use of algorithms seems to neutralize
some obvious biasing factors that plague the pundits routinely.
Why is it that experts paid by Fox News (a Republican-oriented
network) predicted a Romney victory, whereas those paid by
MSNBC (a Democrat-oriented network) predicted that Obama
would win? One possibility is that most of the pundits are
sufficiently corrupt to misstate their actual views if they are paid
enough to do so. More likely, though, their prior commitments
contribute to what information they regard as significant and
color their analyses, which are sincere. This phenomenon, called
confirmation bias, is well studied by psychologists. It is an

november-7-2012/nate-silver.
8
See generally NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE (2012)
(investigating how statisticians distinguish meaningful indicators in everincreasing amounts of data in order to make accurate predictions).
9
Fernand Gobet & Neil Charness, Expertise in Chess, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 523, 532–
34 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006).
10
Geoff Norman et al., Expertise in Medicine and Surgery, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE, supra
note 9, at 339, 350.
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“unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence.”11
The networks engage just those experts whose views are most
likely to reinforce the views of their audience. Similarly, why is
it that the television networks so routinely predicted a close
election? Could it be relevant that these privately-owned media
outlets make their living selling audiences to advertisers, and it
is in their interest to maintain electoral drama for as long as is
feasible? No doubt confirmation bias plays a role here as well.
With the election in mind, let us move to forensic authorship
attribution. In his essay on the current state of the field,
Professor Ronald Butters reminds us, with insight and candor,
that forensic linguists, like practitioners in most areas of forensic
science, have done more to advance their field substantively than
they have done to advance it ethically.12 The program he
suggests is an ambitious one. Butters complains that forensic
authorship attribution lacks not only a set of agreed
understandings about methodology but also lacks, and is in need
13
of, standards sufficient to ensure the exclusion of bogus
conclusions based on inadequate data.14 In this regard, Butters
places methodology beyond mere practice and elevates it to the
realm of the ethical: it is simply wrong for a profession to go
about its business without some verification that it is doing a
good job. Professor Joseph Sanders raises similar points in an
15
essay on the ethical duties of expert witnesses more generally.
What could be more important than making sure that those
academics, whose “day jobs” are to seek the truth, do more
11

Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
12
Ronald R. Butters, Retiring President’s Closing Address: Ethics, Best
Practices, and Standards, PROC. INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC LINGUISTS’ TENTH
BIENNIAL CONF., 2012, at 351–52. The essay is the text of the Presidential
Address delivered by Professor Butters at the meetings of the International
Association of Forensic Linguists, Aston University, Birmingham, U.K., July
2011.
13
Id. at 352–53, 356.
14
See id. at 356.
15
Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539,
1583 (2007) (calling for codes of ethics for individual fields to guide experts
as to their responsibility in taking an appropriate epistemological stand
toward their testimony).
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good than harm when they enter the courtroom with the express
task of presenting analysis that will affect the lives of others in
profound ways?
This essay explores some of the issues that Butters raises in
the context of forensic authorship attribution analysis and that
others have raised for some time in the context of other forensic
sciences that rely on trace evidence.16 My first point is that the
conflict of interest inherent in expert forensic testimony—
especially by those who make their livings, or at least a
significant part of their livings, as consulting experts—can
indeed best be remedied by the development of methods that are
demonstrably both diagnostic and replicable. For those who rely
upon judgments of coauthorship based on their knowledge of
linguistic features and upon a sense that a large cluster of
differences or commonalities in a particular case cannot be a
matter of accident, research into methodology should be a top
priority. Proficiency testing may take the place of the
development of replicable methods in the short run, but the best
direction for the field is to demonstrate that methods work and
are not highly dependent on the skill of the practitioner alone.
My second point is that work in computer science and
computational linguistics is moving toward answering many of
the specific questions that Butters raises about particular
standards in the field. Such matters as how much data are
needed for valid conclusions to be drawn are commonplace in
statistics and modeling, and can easily enough be transported to
forensic linguistic application. I end this essay with some brief
conjecture about why the field does not appear to have moved
ahead quickly with respect to some of these questions and what
it might do to adjust its course.
II. LUCY AND LACY: TWO STYLES OF EXPERT ANALYSIS
Those who engage regularly in expert consultation, and
especially in expert testimony, have an inherent conflict of
16

See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–42 (2002).
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interest. It is sometimes referred to as the “hired gun”
syndrome, and it stems from the fact that testifying experts are
encouraged to render opinions useful to the party that hires them
and are subject to confirmation bias in any event. Consider the
following vignette about expert witness Lucy:
Lucy is a professor of computational linguistics and
currently has a grant-funded project on authorship
identification, which she hopes will have practical
application eventually. Last month, a lawyer phoned
Lucy, saying he had heard of her work, and asked her if
she would be willing to apply it to a legal case and
possibly testify as an expert. Lucy was intrigued. She
took the case, analyzed it according to the methods that
she had developed, and concluded, by virtue of applying
her algorithm, that the questioned document the lawyer
presented was very unlikely to have been written by the
person to whose known writings she had compared it. In
her lab, Lucy was correct 88% of the time when she
conducted this kind of analysis this way. She told the
lawyer that she would be happy to testify to all of this, as
she continues to work in her lab to improve the 88% rate
of accurate rejection of authorship.
Now compare Lucy to Lacy:
Lacy is a forensic linguistic consultant. From time to
time she takes authorship attribution cases. Lacy does not
conduct her work computationally. Rather, she has a set
of thirty-six stylistic markers by which she analyzes all
documents that come to her. She has found from past
experience that when the documents are long enough for
comparison, some of these thirty-six markers will tend
either to co-occur between a questioned document and a
reference set or be noticeably different between them.
There is sometimes controversy about whether her
testimony will be permitted, but when she is allowed to
testify, her testimony is generally convincing.
At first glance, we might prefer Lucy. After all, we know
how good her methods are, making it less likely that she is a
hired gun. With Lacy, in contrast, we must rely on her
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persuasive rhetoric and the intuitive appeal of the data she
presents.
Herein lies the problem: we have no idea which expert does
a better job. It may well be that Lacy limits herself to the kinds
of problems that she is certain to get right and that her success
rate exceeds Lucy’s not unimpressive 88%. On the other hand,
it may be that Lacy gets a lot of slack from her charisma and
the intuitive appeal of her analyses and that her success rate is
far lower than Lucy’s.
Over the past two decades, forensic linguistics, I believe, has
developed as a field with more Lacys than Lucys, and this has
led to some of the problems that Butters observes. Many
involved in the field—especially authorship attribution specialists
who rely on stylistic markers—conduct little or no laboratory
work. This is true both of independent consultants and of
academics who self-identify as forensic linguists. The result is a
dearth of serious research, provoking reasonable questions about
the legitimacy of the conclusions reached. As noted below,
proficiency testing may be at least a partial solution to this
problem, but no such testing currently takes place. At the same
time, somewhat disconnectedly, computer scientists and
computational linguists have been developing algorithms that
more and more successfully predict authorship, but much of this
has not yet made its way to forensic application.17
This tension was not always so pronounced. The history of
“voiceprint” analysis provides quite a different story. During the
1960s, an employee of Bell Labs, which invented the sound
17

For the state of current research, see Shlomo Argamon & Moshe
Koppel, A Systemic Functional Approach to Automated Authorship Analysis,
21 J.L. & POL’Y 299 (2013); Moshe Koppel et al., Authorship Attribution:
What’s Easy and What’s Hard?, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 317 (2013); Efstathios
Stamatatos, On the Robustness of Authorship Attribution Based on Character
N-Gram Features, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 421 (2013). For an overview, see Carole
E. Chaski, Author Identification in the Forensic Setting, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 489 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M.
Solan eds., 2012); Patrick Juola, Authorship Attribution, 1 FOUND. &
TRENDS IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 233 (2008). For general discussion, see
Lawrence M. Solan, The Expert Witness Meets the Adversarial System, in
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 395 (Malcolm
Coulthard & Alison Johnson eds., 2010).
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spectrograph, began to make extravagant claims about the ability
of such devices to distinguish one voice from another, much the
way fingerprints were (and still largely are) seen as
distinguishable from one person to the next.18 Police laboratories
received training in the use of the new technology, about which
there was considerable excitement.19 Then, in 1979, the National
Research Council issued a devastating report, pointing out that
there had not been adequate testing to determine how well
spectrography can be used to distinguish one voice from the
other in forensic settings.20 The report noted:
The degree of accuracy, and the corresponding error
rates, of aural-visual voice identification vary widely
from case to case, depending upon several conditions
including the properties of the voices involved, the
conditions under which the voice samples were made, the
characteristics of the equipment used, the skill of the
examiner making the judgments, and the examiner’s
knowledge about the case. Estimates of error rates now
available pertain to only a few of the many combinations
of conditions in real-life situations. These estimates do
not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or
legislative body to use in making judgments concerning
the reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice
identification in forensic applications.21
The leaders in the effort to make sure that linguistic science,
if used in law enforcement efforts, would meet the high
standards of science itself were chiefly academic linguists, with

18

See Lawrence G. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253,
1257 (1962). For discussion of this history, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN &
PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 140, 140–46 (2005) and Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma, Hearing
Voices: Speaker Identification in Court, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 373, 416–26
(2003).
19
See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 140.
20
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ON THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 58 (1979).
21
Id. at 60.
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special efforts by the distinguished phonetician, Peter
Ladefoged.22
Fast-forward to 2009, when the National Research Council
came out with another devastating report, this time concerning
forensic identification science in the United States more
generally. The report decried the absence of scientific integrity
in forensic identification procedures, much as the earlier report
did with respect to speaker identification technology used at the
time:
A body of research is required to establish the limits and
measures of performance and to address the impact of
sources of variability and potential bias. Such research is
sorely needed, but it seems to be lacking in most of the
forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of
matching characteristics. These disciplines need to
develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective
interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research and
evaluation programs.23
Yet now, it is not the linguistic academic community taking
the lead in remedying this situation on behalf of linguists who do
not want to see the legal system making excessive claims about
the forensic application of the language sciences. Rather, it is
chiefly legal academics with expertise in the area of scientific
evidence taking the lead, with the focus not on linguistics in
24
particular but on the forensic identification sciences generally.
What has happened between 1979 and 2009? In 1979, there was
no field of forensic linguistics, or at least not much of one.
Linguists were occasionally called to testify as experts in court,
but they did so because their academic expertise serendipitously
crossed paths with a legal issue, much the way an academic
physicist or engineer might be called upon to provide expert
testimony. Linguists were in the business of being linguists, and
22

See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 140–41.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 8 (2009).
24
See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits They Might Acquit: The
Value of Forensic Science Testimony, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 21
(2011); Risinger et al., supra note 16; Sanders, supra note 15.
23
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the legal system was as much a novelty to them as they were a
novelty to the legal system. As late as 1994, Judith Levi, one of
the founders of the field of forensic linguistics, wrote the
inaugural article in the then-brand-new journal Forensic
Linguistics (now, The International Journal of Speech, Language
and the Law), explaining to the linguistics community at large
the growing acceptance of linguistic experts in court.25
Since that time, things have developed considerably. With
the growth of undergraduate and graduate programs in forensic
linguistics,26 many academics devote much of their time to
applying linguistic knowledge in legal settings, as do consulting
linguists without academic affiliations. The gap between the
academic community that once policed its field for abuse by the
legal system and practitioners within the legal system has shrunk
considerably.
Some in the language and law community have recognized
this gap between theory and practice to be a healthy one and
have attempted to maintain it in their description of how
linguists engaged in courtroom testimony should view their
work. Peter Tiersma, a law professor and linguist (with whom I
frequently write), suggests that the field is at its best when the
reluctant scholar is asked to share her expertise with the court
for the benefit of reaching a proper result in a dispute in which
the expert has no interest, either intellectual or otherwise.27
Roger Shuy, a distinguished scholar in applied linguistics who
has been a prolific writer in the field, states the forensic
linguist’s ideal role more fully:
[Forensic linguistics] has become a useful way to refer to
the use of linguistics knowledge where there are data that
25

See Judith N. Levi, Language as Evidence: The Linguist as Expert
Witness in North American Courts, 1 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 1 (1994). For
subsequent history, see Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The
Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in American Courts, 78
LANGUAGE 221 (2002).
26
Such programs exist at Cardiff University, Aston University
(Birmingham, UK), Universitat Pomeu Fabra (Barcelona), and Hofstra
University.
27
Peter M. Tiersma, Linguistic Issues in the Law, 69 LANGUAGE 113,
122 (1993).
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serve as evidence. But I have some concerns about the
term itself, because it seems that when one does
“forensic linguistics” one is simply doing linguistics, a
type of applied linguistics, in fact.28
These views are attractive. To the extent that they are
descriptively accurate views of the field, they explain how it was
that the academic phoneticians were the ones who shut down the
voiceprint craze of the 1960s and ‘70s.
Now, however, expert testimony on questions of language
goes beyond ordinary research in linguistics into areas developed
by those interested in forensic linguistics as its own discipline.29
Individuals, sometimes without a great deal of training in
linguistics, generally become skilled in areas of language
analysis developed particularly for consumption by the legal
30
community. For reasons stated earlier, many practitioners have
little motivation to police their own methodologies along the
conventional scientific criteria of validity and reliability and
typically do not engage in analysis of methods used by others,
apart from disagreement within a particular case in which they
have taken opposing positions. The result of this development is
that it is not always possible to judge forensic testimony against
ordinary practices among linguists, because linguists do not
ordinarily engage in the activities that generate the expert
testimony.
Does this amount to an ethical issue? It probably does if
neither methodological testing nor proven individual proficiency
forms a sufficient scientific basis to accept some of what passes
for linguistic expertise. Moreover, to the extent that this lack of
foundation results from the dearth of research that is itself a
product of this conflict, then it is the fruit of a conflict of
interest and is an ethical issue for this reason. Law professor
and philosopher Susan Haack puts it this way:

28

ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTICS IN THE COURTROOM: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 3 (2006).
29
See Ronald R. Butters, The Forensic Linguist’s Professional
Credentials, 16 INT’L J. SPEECH LANGUAGE & L. 237 (2009).
30
Contra SHUY, supra note 28, at 3.
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Distinguishing genuine inquiry, the real thing, from
pseudo-inquiry or “sham reasoning,” C.S. Peirce—a
working scientist as well as the greatest of American
philosophers—wrote that “the spirit . . . is the most
essential thing—the motive”; that genuine inquiry consists
in “actually drawing the bow upon truth with intentness
in the eye, with energy in the arm.” For the same
reason, I am tempted to write of advocacy “research” (in
scare quotes); for it is something of a stretch to call
advocacy research “research” at all. Advocacy
“research” is like inquiry insofar as it involves seeking
out evidence. But it is part of an advocacy project insofar
as it involves seeking out evidence favoring a
predetermined conclusion; and it is undertaken in the
spirit, from the motive, of an advocate. In short, it is a
kind of pseudo-inquiry.31
At the same time, as noted previously, there is no reason to
conclude that intuitive expertise based on experience and insight
fares any better or worse than does algorithmic expertise.
Intuitive expertise is not necessarily unreliable. On the contrary,
it is clear that at least in some settings, people are able to form
sophisticated mental models of situations about which they are
experts and to weigh relevant factors with great accuracy,
notwithstanding that they are unable to describe how they did it.
For example, Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, made
famous the story of the J. Paul Getty Museum’s acquisition of a
2,000-year-old Greek sculpture—a kouros—which is a rare thing
to acquire.32 The museum did its due diligence carefully,
investigating the sculpture’s provenance over the centuries,
engaging experts to examine the marble with microscopes, and
33
so on. But the day of reckoning came when the museum’s
curator began inviting various experts in classical sculpture,
none of whom felt that the sculpture was authentic, and one of
whom remarked that seeing it caused in him a wave of “intuitive
31

Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay
in Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1071 (2008).
32
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 3 (2005).
33
Id. at 3–4.
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repulsion.”34 For the most part, the experts could not put into
words exactly what was bothering them, but deep within
themselves, they knew.35 Later, all agreed that the kouros was a
kouros copy.36
The kouros story is particularly relevant here because it is,
in a sense, a matter of authorship attribution: who sculpted the
kouros that the museum had bought? Thus, we may wish to ask
about the nature of the knowledge that the experts brought with
them to the task that led to their negative reactions. As Daniel
Kahneman points out,37 celebrations of gut-reaction decision
making, such as Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink, also contain stories
of terrible diagnostic failure, including the misdiagnosis of heart
attacks.38 And we’ve already seen how well political experts do
at predicting election results. Many in the business of predicting
the future of the economy are on a par with the political pundits.
It thus appears that intuitive expertise is neither all good nor all
bad as a diagnostic tool.39
Psychologists have devoted a great deal of study to the
question of expert intuition, in areas as diverse as the thinking of
chess masters, medical diagnosis and treatment by physicians,
neonatal intensive care nursing, and decision making about
firefighting.40 What appears to separate the intuitive experts from
the rest of us is a deep base of knowledge that has enabled them
to build mental models41 that are so robust that they can be both
accessed and expanded with ease. Chess masters do far better

34

Id. at 5–6.
Id.
36
Id. at 7.
37
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 235–36 (2011).
38
GLADWELL, supra note 32, at 130.
39
For a discussion of how scientific analysis and subjective analysis
blend in diagnosis in many domains, see John A. Swets et al., Psychological
Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB.
INTEREST 1 (2000).
40
For discussion of the circumstances in which intuitive expertise is most
likely to prevail, see Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions of Intuitive
Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515, 522 (2009).
41
For an overview of what constitutes a mental model, see P.N.
JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 10–12 (1983).
35

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

564

than do novices in recalling the pieces in familiar chess
configurations but generally do not do significantly better in
recalling the pieces placed at random on a chess board.42
Moreover, the more such configurations are familiar to them—
because they devote their lives to studying these configurations—
the broader the range of improved recall.43 By the same token,
experienced doctors, when asked the basis of a diagnosis, do not
resort to basic science, even though they were taught and know
the mechanisms underlying disease. In a hard case they may
resort to their basic training, but as a general matter, they have
developed, based on huge numbers of observations, a wealth of
knowledge of what combinations of symptoms and conditions
are indicative of disease and can do this with great accuracy,
even when they are not able to articulate how it is that they
assigned particular weights to particular symptoms in a
particular setting.44 And the same holds true for the impressive
record of neonatal intensive care nurses, fire commanders, and
other such experts.45 Each group of experts develops mental
models capable of distinguishing the successful from the
unsuccessful based upon repeated exposures to a wealth of
scenarios.
Thus, while Lacy relies upon intuitive judgment more than
does Lucy, depending upon how conservative Lacy is in her
willingness to offer expert opinions, her rate of error may be
lower than that of Lucy. Yet, when given a choice, the legal
system typically opts for Lucy-like expertise, not because we
know that she is more likely to be correct, but because we at
least know how likely she is to be right, reducing the probability
42

Gobet & Charness, supra note 9, at 526–27.
Id. at 526. Nonetheless, the machines have caught up to and passed
the chess masters. For an interesting account, see SILVER, supra note 8, at
262–93 (describing Garry Kasparov’s games with computer chess programs
during the 1980s and 90s and his eventual loss to Deep Blue in 1997).
44
Norman et al., supra note 10, at 346.
45
For a description of some of this research and a theory of what makes
intuitive expertise successful in these circumstances, see Karol G. Ross et al.,
Professional Judgments and “Naturalistic Decision Making,” in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE, supra
note 9, at 403, 403–15.
43
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that cognitive biases or a witness’s compelling personality will
play too great a role in the outcome of a case.46 Making the case
for algorithmic expertise more compelling, people are much
better at recognizing the biases of others than they are at
recognizing their own biases.47 Thus, encouraging experts to
recognize and stave off the temptation of becoming too much a
team player is not likely to be an adequate solution to the
problem of bias.
The literature on the nature of intuitive expertise raises
another concern with respect to authorship attribution. Expert
opinion testimony is admissible only if the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.48
It is not clear how much of the expert opinion of intuitive
experts on authorship attribution is a matter of expertise. To see
why this is the case, let us look at a Lacy-like analysis taken
from an article by Australian linguist Robert Eagelson.49
Eagleson describes a case in which a woman supposedly left a
farewell letter to her husband, typed on the family typewriter,
when she ran off with another man.50 The police believed,
however, that the husband had written the letter, and had done
away with the wife.51 A linguist was called in to compare the
style of the farewell letter with the style of writing of documents
known to be written by the husband and documents known to
the written by the wife.52
46

See Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
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The results were dramatic. The husband’s known writings
and the farewell letter shared a number of nonstandard spellings
(individual words, capitalization of common nouns, lower case
proper nouns, use of apostrophe), syntactic structures, word
structures, and punctuation nuances.53 The wife’s writings had
none of these features.54 To take one example, both the
husband’s writings and the farewell letter used the present tense
when it would have been appropriate to use the past tense (“He
threaten me.”).55 After the results of this analysis were presented
to the husband, he confessed.56
But there is a problem here. The grouping of similarities and
differences indeed requires some sophistication in the analysis of
language. It is unlikely that someone not trained in linguistics
would have come up with this array. Once the linguistic expert
did so, however, there was no particular science behind the
inference that the husband was more likely than the wife to have
written the farewell letter. It only makes sense given the array
of similarities with the husband’s style and differences from the
wife’s, but it makes sense because of what our common sense
notions tell us about how likely people are to be consistent about
such aspects of their writing. Missing is the kind of experience
that the doctors, neonatal nurses, chess players, and others
describe in which the similar patterns are presented to them over
and over again with the results known quickly. Other Lacy-like
examples show the same characteristics—a substantial, and often
intuitively convincing, number of similarities between a
questioned document and the writings of a suspect, with no
serious science underlying the inference of authorship
57
identification.
This leaves the legal system with three choices: it can accept
the expert testimony, opinion and all; it can reject the expert
testimony on similarities and differences entirely; or it can admit
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the testimony, but permit the jury to draw the inferences of
identity for which there is not an adequate scientific basis. Each
of these options has its own difficulties.
The problem with the first option is that there is no basis for
crediting the opinion of the expert. In the next section, I
recommend proficiency testing to legitimize expert testimony in
these circumstances.
The second option, while seemingly attractive, especially to
those who favor an algorithmic approach, also comes with a
price. It takes from the jury the ability to evaluate evidence with
more sophistication. Take, for example, a point raised by
Malcolm Coulthard58: the government offers evidence in a fraud
case that a letter whose authorship is in question contains the
same kinds of linguistic nuances (spelling errors, punctuation,
59
and so on) as do the known writings of the defendant. No
60
expert is needed. Now, the defense offers an expert to
demonstrate that these same features are present in the writings
of other possible authors.61 Only the expert conducted the
evaluation of the documents, so without his testimony, they will
not be before the jury.62 It would seem that justice is better
served if the expert is permitted to point out similarities with
other potential authors, regardless of there being no algorithm
that can demonstrate a likelihood of actual authorship. After all,
that is exactly what the prosecution has done without an expert
in its efforts to implicate the defendant.
The third option—permitting the expert to point out
similarities and differences, but not to issue an opinion on
attribution—also has its problems. The approach has initial
appeal. On the one hand, the comparison seems to be relevant to
the outcome. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing
how good the expert’s lay intuitions are likely to be. No studies
have been conducted to tell us. They may be right most of the
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time when so many features are either shared or differentiated,
but we simply do not know. In a different context, I
recommended that courts accept a “tour guide” approach to
expert linguists testifying about meaning.63 When each side
appears to have proposed a reasonable interpretation of legally
relevant language, a linguist may point out the various plausible
interpretations and explain how they derive from ordinary
64
linguistic processes. This kind of testimony poses little danger,
since the judge and jury are perfectly capable, based on their
intuitions as speakers of English, to determine whether the
linguist’s testimony accurately reflects their own judgments
about the range of possible meanings.65 Moreover, once the
range of plausible interpretations is brought out, the linguist’s
expert opinion about meaning is largely superfluous, since the
expert will have put the jury on an equal footing with him by
66
virtue of the testimony.
Authorship attribution is different, however. The goal of the
expert is not to make jurors sensitive to the full range of their
intuitions about authorship but rather to determine who wrote
the questioned document. We do not know, however, to what
extent the expert testimony on similarities and differences is
helpful and how much it leads jurors to intuitive judgment
without adequate basis to determine whether the similarities and
differences that appear so telling have any real predictive force.
Thus, as Edward Cheng points out, “[t]he heavy-lifting in
developing an authorship attribution technique should occur in
the lab, long before it is applied in a legal case.”67 While that is
happening, however, courts are faced with the uncomfortable
dilemmas described above. Let us now turn to how the
American legal system has reacted to these issues and how the
field might develop to increase its efficacy in court.
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III. JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO AUTHORSHIP ATTRIBUTION
EVIDENCE
This section comments on what the American courts have
been saying about authorship identification expertise in the
United States. However, as Peter Tiersma and I have pointed
out,68 relying upon published opinions to draw conclusions about
evidentiary decisions by American courts is not likely to present
a fair sense of what actually happens in trial courts. The case
law provides a very deferential approach to appeals of decisions
69
on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, and most (but
not all) of the appeals will occur in the context of the losing
party having been denied in their application to have an expert
testify. The result is that most evidentiary decisions in published
opinions by appellate courts are affirmances of the decision of
the trial court to exclude an expert. An academic, or for that
matter, a lawyer or judge, who relies on these opinions will not
have any idea in how many cases experts have indeed testified at
trial. Yet such testimony will occur when both sides call experts
on the same issue, when one side calls an expert without
objection from the other side, or when the offer of an expert
survives a motion to exclude, but the case does not result in a
published opinion, at least not on that issue.
Prominent examples have appeared in the press in 2011 and
2012. For example, Robert Leonard and Ronald Butters each
testified in the Chicago murder case, People v. Coleman.70
71
Coleman was accused of killing his wife. Part of the
prosecution’s story was that he had written various threat letters,
72
one of them painted as graffiti on a wall. Leonard, testifying as
part of the prosecution’s case, was permitted to opine that the
68
69
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stylistic features of the threat letters had enough in common to
suggest that all were written by the same individual and that the
letters bore enough similarity to the known writings of Coleman
that it was a reasonable—but not proven—hypothesis that
Coleman wrote them.73 Butters argued that there was not enough
evidence to permit one to draw legitimate inferences.74 Coleman
was convicted.75 As an aside, the circumstantial evidence was
strong: Coleman had bought the paint that was used to write the
threat on the wall, and the other letters were found on his
computer.76 Thus, the linguistic debate was offered only to dispel
the possibility that someone other than Coleman had used his
computer. Nonetheless, the Coleman case demonstrates an
instance in which courts permitted forensic stylistic analysis after
ruling it admissible in an evidentiary hearing.
Also in the press were stories about an expert declaration by
Gerald McMenamin, a linguist who specializes in forensic
stylistic analysis. McMenamin testified in a case brought by Paul
Ceglia against Mark Zuckerberg, claiming that Zuckerberg did
not own the Facebook idea.77 McMenamin opined that certain
emails allegedly written by Zuckerberg were in fact not written
by Zuckerberg. The methods he used have drawn criticism from
Professor Butters78 and some controversy in the press.79
Nonetheless, in an opinion issued but not published as of the
73
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time of this writing, a federal Magistrate Judge has credited
McMenamin’s position80 and recommended that the district court
dismiss the case against Zuckerberg and Facebook.81
McMenamin has testified in authorship cases on many
occasions, and in fact has written a book that describes his
stylistic approach.82 But, unless and until the Magistrate Judge’s
opinion (or another opinion discussing McMenamin’s
contribution) in the Facebook litigation is published, he shows
up in the federal and state reporters only indirectly, through a
former FBI agent and forensic linguist named James Fitzgerald.
83
In a 2010 federal case decided by the District Court in Utah,
and a case decided by the federal court in New Jersey in 2000,84
Fitzgerald testified in a Daubert hearing that he was employing
McMenamin’s methods in an authorship attribution case.85 In
both cases the court permitted him to testify as to similarities
and differences between the defendant’s known writings and
those that were in question in the case but not to offer an
opinion as to authorship because the methods did not meet the
scientific standard required by the Federal Rules of Evidence.86
In contrast, an appellate opinion of the New Jersey state
courts affirmed a conviction in a case in which Fitzgerald
testified for the prosecution that the defendant had written
certain anonymous documents, and Carole Chaski testified that
there were significant differences between the anonymous
documents and those known to be written by the defendant.87
The defendant was actually acquitted of having created the
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anonymous documents.88 The matter of fact discussion by the
appellate court, however, suggests no problem with trial judges
admitting expert testimony of forensic linguists, including
opinion as to authorship, whether they conduct their work
through stylistic comparison or by virtue of algorithms that they
have developed. When one party decides to deal with the other
side’s expert by hiring his own, there will typically be no
rejection of either expert. Judges are not likely to exclude a
witness absent an objection from the opposing party. Moreover,
unless the case results in a published decision, there will be no
publicly salient record of the entire episode. In fact, the court in
this case mentioned the forensic linguistic testimony only as an
aside, since the defendant had been acquitted on the count for
which the testimony was offered.
My goal in this discussion is not to criticize the linguists
whose methods were at issue in these cases. On the contrary,
much of this essay is devoted to suggesting that stylistic analysis
is not provably less reliable than the quantitative methods. My
hope is that through communication among those who approach
the field from different perspectives, it becomes possible to
make such methods crisp enough to withstand scrutiny or at least
to integrate their most acute insights into quantitative models.
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN FORENSIC LINGUISTIC AUTHORSHIP
ATTRIBUTION
The field appears to be developing to bring a healthy balance
between theory and practice in forensic linguistic identification.
The basic problem that the field must address is this: as we
learned from Noam Chomsky more than a half century ago,
89
language is a creative cognitive function. By that, I do not
mean to say that we can all be poets if we wish. What
“creative” in this context means is that we can produce and
understand infinitely many utterances because the rules of a
recursive grammar that we have internalized in our minds,
mostly as young children, combined with a rich vocabulary, give
88
89
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us the capacity to do this. And we indeed use the capacity. As
Malcolm Coulthard has pointed out, based on the work of some
computational linguists,90 if you highlight any ten-word string
from any document, and then paste that string into a search
engine (e.g., Google) or database (e.g., Lexis) window, you will
find that your string is unique among the vast array of
documents available.91 This shows enormous intra-authorial
variation in the use of language. We really do not say things the
same way twice. What this all means is that the challenge facing
authorship attribution research is to discover ways in which the
variation in the use of language between authors is demonstrably
greater than the variation within a particular author and to focus
on the presence or absence of these distinguishing features.
As noted, there seems to be a methodological, and for that
matter, cultural division between computational and stylistic
analysts, with the former approaching authorship attribution
problems in a manner more consistent with conventional views
of expert testimony than the latter but with no evidence that
either approach does a better job. Three things are likely to
bring about a convergence. First, I expect that if the
computational approaches reach some level of maturity and
consensus, they will be far more often accepted by the courts
than those approaches based largely on intuition—even excellent
intuition based on experience and learning. Computational
linguistics is an established subfield of linguistic inquiry. Thus,
it really is possible to apply well-known linguistic techniques to
a forensic problem and to ask whether the application in the
forensic setting meets the standards of the field itself.92 By the
90
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same token, computational linguists and computer scientists are
accustomed to testing their algorithms to see how well they work
and reporting the rate of error. One conference, for example,
requires the submission of an answer to an authorship attribution
task as a criterion for participation.93 These procedures are
consistent with contemporary views of acceptable scientific
evidence.94 If judges, at least in the United States, begin to
accept authorship identification as a routine matter precisely
because it is transparently algorithmic, with identifiable rates of
error, then such work will become the standard.
Second, it will be incumbent upon those whose work is more
intuitively stylistic to demonstrate its scientific underpinnings.
This can be accomplished by incorporating stylistic features into
the computational algorithms being developed by computational
linguists and computer scientists. The insightful observations of
stylistic analysts that take advantage of such nuances as word
choice, punctuation, and spelling errors can be used to expand
the range of factors that computer scientists include in their
models, with the potential of adding power, even if only
incrementally. In fact, this is already occurring.95 Progress can
also be made through the creation of models that demonstrate
the efficacy of stylistic analysis as its own approach. Tim Grant,
in his article in this volume, has taken a significant step in that
Practices and Admissibility of Forensic Author Identification, 21 J.L. &
POL’Y 333 (2013); Patrick Juola, Stylometry and Immigration: A Case Study,
21 J.L. & POL’Y 287 (2013); Koppel et al., supra note 17; Stamatatos, supra
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377 (2013); see also Chaski, supra note 17, at 489 (summarizing the state of
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direction.96 This will no doubt require far more collaboration
between the forensic linguistic community and those adept at
statistical modeling. Such collaboration has not been adequate to
date. Many of the questions that Butters raises (such as how
large an effect must be for it to merit evidentiary weight) are
answered automatically in computational settings by virtue of the
models employed. Similarly, for those engaged in the promising
methods of using linguistic corpora as reference sets in
authorship attribution,97 collaboration with modelers will become
a necessity.
In the short run, proficiency testing may substitute for the
development of methods, although this remains a second-best
solution because it does not eliminate the potential for bias in
actual case work. Those linguists who demonstrate their ability
to identify authorship correctly in a series of problems presented
to them would be credited in court for their proven prowess
irrespective of whether their methods are replicable. The
98
PAN/CLEF conference mentioned above, in which computer
scientists test their methods against each other as a prerequisite
for participation in the event, might be expanded to include
those who analyze authorship cases through stylistic comparison.
This is an especially appealing solution in that it may well be the
case that the stylistic analysts are highly accurate in their
conclusions. Personal communication with some of the
organizers of this conference suggests that they would be
enthusiastic about such participation. It is also important, of
course, that those whose work depends on algorithms be willing
to subject their models to testing of the sort described above.
Self-proclaimed excellence is no more scientific when asserted
by computer scientists than when asserted by stylistic analysts.
Third, and related to my second point, some computer
scientists and some linguists have taken to looking at very large
sets of features, largely stylistic markers, not concerning
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themselves with which features appear relevant in a particular
case, as long as enough do. One such research project uses
cluster analysis to sort through a large corpus of emails and to at
least reduce the pool of potential authors from a great many to a
few with considerable accuracy.99 Tim Grant’s work also makes
use of “a basket of features,” concerning itself more with the
number of features in common than with whether a particular
feature or kind of feature is likely to be predictive across
cases.100
Whether I am right or wrong in predicting the subsequent
direction of the field, I firmly believe that far more collaboration
among scholars with different areas of expertise is absolutely
essential. And I would like nothing more than to see a
significant increase in collaboration notwithstanding any conflicts
experienced by the players and without a precipitating crisis.
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